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AFTERWORD

The Discovery of Truth in Context
COMMENTS ON FAIGMAN, KATSKEE, AND KEIL
Sam Glucksberg†
Truth is hard to come by, even in optimal circumstances
where the criteria are explicit and clear, and where it can be
objectively established whether those criteria have been met
(at least in principle). Consider baseball. When a batter does
not swing at the ball, the umpire must make the call. Is it a
strike or a ball? The criteria are explicit: the ball must be
within the strike zone. The batter knows this, the pitcher
knows this, the fans know this, and the umpire, of course, also
knows this. The criteria are clear. In principle, one could have
the decision made by machine, as it is often done in tennis.
Despite the empirical clarity and explicit decision rules, there
are still three ways of construing the truth every time the
umpire makes the call. The first might be called objective
realism: when queried, an umpire who is committed to this
position would say, “I call them as they are.” The second,
subjective realism: “I call them as I see them.” The third, what
might be called declarative realism: asserted by one of the
greatest umpires of his time, Bill Klem, “It ain’t nothin’ till I
call it.”1
From my layperson’s point of view, many judicial
decisions, even those informed by scientific realism, seem to be
somewhat akin to Klem’s decisions. They are constrained by
the relevant criteria and by the “objective” facts, yet they
ultimately depend on human judgment. A case that comes to
†
1

Professor of Psychology Emeritus, Princeton University.
See GEORGE SULLIVAN & BARBARA LAGOWSKI, THE SPORTS CURMUDGEON

164 (1993).
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mind is a decision by the International Court of Justice. That
court decided that the massacre of Bosnian Muslims at
Srebrenica in 1995 was an act of genocide, but that Serbia
itself was not guilty of the crime2. Judicial decisions such as
this constitute a particular type of speech act. According to the
philosopher of language, John Searle, there are roughly five
kinds of speech acts: assertives, whereby we describe a state of
the world such as “today is Friday”; directives, where we
request something, such as “could you please hand me a glass
of water”; commissives, whereby we commit ourselves to some
course of action, such as “I’ll have chicken tonight”; expressives,
whereby we tell people how we feel about something, such as “I
really enjoyed today’s sessions”; and, most relevant to this
discussion, declarations, whereby we accomplish something
merely by saying something.3 Bill Klem’s shouting “Steerike!”
defined that pitch as a strike, just as the International Court of
Justice’s declaration that genocide had occurred did not simply
label an act, but also defined the 1995 massacre as an act of
genocide.
These two examples illustrate not only the nature of
declaratives, but also that most speech acts accomplish more
than one thing at a time. In these examples of calling a strike
and declaring an act of genocide, the speakers are not only
describing a state of the world but characterizing those states.
Calling a strike creates a strike and purports to describe a
state of the world—the ball is asserted to have been in the
strike zone. Declaring an act of genocide not only creates a new
act of genocide, but also asserts that the act did in fact violate
the United Nations Convention on Genocide.
I do not know if Professor David Faigman would agree,
but it seems to me that the concept of scientific realism4 and
issues of factual “truth” share some of the properties of these
examples. Scientific realism is the assumption that there is a
real world independent of our minds that can be studied
scientifically. At the very least, the notion of scientific truth
should encompass not just fact finding, but also fact creation—
not just asserting, but declaring that an act meets the criteria
2
Marlise Simons, Court Declares Bosnia Killings Were Genocide, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 2007.
3
JOHN R. SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING: STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF
SPEECH ACTS 12-20 (1979).
4
For elaboration of this concept, see generally David L. Faigman, Scientific
Realism in Constitutional Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1067 (2008) (this volume).
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for, say, genocide. This not only declares that a particular act
meets those criteria, but also creates a new member of that
category of acts.5
Faigman’s discussion of scientific realism and the place
of facts in the context of constitutional interpretation reminds
me of the debates in economics concerning another kind of
realism, “behavioral realism.” Behavioral realism refers to the
use of scientific knowledge about people to evaluate assumptions (often unfounded) about human nature. The work of such
scholars as Amos Tversky, Danny Kahneman, and Richard
Thaler,6 among many others, raises important challenges to
the concept of “rational man,” culminating only recently in the
establishment of behavioral economics as a recognized discipline.7 While by no means universally accepted, more and more
economists are recognizing the relevance of behavioral and
social science findings to economic theory and practice. Again,
from my layperson’s perspective, scientific realism seems to
be a necessity not only in economics but also in legal interpretation, especially in those contexts where abstract concepts
such as equality and liberty must be instantiated anew as time
passes and the world changes.
From a psychological/behavioral standpoint, people’s
understandings of abstract concepts are rarely, if ever, explicit.
Instead, such concepts can be inferred by examining how they
are instantiated in a given context. As Faigman clearly points
out, as times and circumstances change, people’s constructions
of concepts such as segregation also change. The notion that
segregation is inherently unequal provides a good example of
unanticipated instantiation. Consider the problem of warring
gangs in prisons: when gang members are assigned cell blocks
on the basis of their race or ethnicity, is this an instance of
“segregation”? Just as declaring that the murder of Bosnian
Muslims was genocide, declaring that the concept of segregation is or is not applicable to the gang situation instantiates
that concept in a new way. The transcendent concepts listed by
5
For elaboration of this view, see generally Richard B. Katskee, Science,
Intersubjective Validity, and Judicial Legitimacy, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 857 (2008) (this
volume).
6
See, e.g., AMOS TVERSKY, PREFERENCE, BELIEF, AND SIMILARITY: SELECTED
WRITINGS (Eldar Shafir ed., 2004).
7
Also culminating in a Nobel Prize in economics to Kahneman for his work
with Tversky on heuristics and biases in decision-making under uncertainty. Daniel
Altman, A Nobel That Bridges Economics and Psychology, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2002,
at C1.
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Faigman, such as free speech, free exercise of religion, equal
protection, and due process, may well be eternal truths, but
those truths must necessarily be instantiated in concrete cases
as people decide whether situation X is a case of free speech or
due process or equal protection. Declaring or not declaring it so
is analogous to calling a ball or a strike; in a very real sense,
saying so makes it so. And because our world is dynamic and
changing, such decisions must always be made anew (Justice
Thomas notwithstanding). In short, Faigman’s arguments are
remarkably consistent with what we know in cognitive science
about the nature of human concept learning, concept structure,
and concept instantiation and application.
Because general concepts must be instantiated anew
with every new context, there is ample opportunity for biases to
shape and color each new instantiation. Faigman’s analysis of
biases in social science research is consistent with what we
know of bias effects and how we try to minimize them. The
opportunities for biases to affect the selection of problems, the
definition of the subjects of study, determination of what to
conclude, discriminating between fact and value, and
assessment of the validity and applicability of evidence are
virtually endless. The first step to minimize bias is to explicitly
recognize that there is a distinction between fact and value.
Further, and not incidentally, this requires explicit adherence
to the proposition that there is a real world, independent of our
minds, and that we can discover facts about that world. Then,
as in all sciences, we must do what we can to minimize bias in
every phase of our work. For example, in both behavioral and
medical research, we employ double blind studies to minimize
both observer and participant bias effects. We use placebos in
medical research to isolate the effects of expectations from the
effects of the treatment under investigation. As Faigman
observes, even the “hard” sciences such as physics recognize
the interactive effects of observer, observer position, and the
phenomena under study.8 I agree with his analyses and
concerns, and with his conclusion: “Adhering to the scientific
method . . . perhaps provides only a limited, and not entirely
satisfying, check on [the effects] of researchers’ biases. But,
however imperfect the process might be, the benefits of
scientific social inquiry are worth the effort.”9
8
9

Faigman, supra note 4, at 1089-90.
Id. at 1091.
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Faigman points out that all scientists, not just social
scientists, are subject to the biases that might be generated
from one or another normative positions.10 But I am not
convinced that “a natural scientist’s inquiry tends to be less
inherently value-laden.”11 For starters, all scientists usually
start off with a favored hypothesis, and natural scientists’
commitments to their pet theories are no less strongly held
than those of social scientists. When a hypothesis is firmly
held, it makes not a whit of difference if the science is physical
or social: observer error driven by bias must always be
minimized by following appropriate procedures. A prime
example is provided by Alfred Binet in his efforts to determine
if intelligence is related to brain size. Binet firmly believed that
children with larger brains were more successful in school than
those with smaller brains, and his measurements of skull size
(as a surrogate variable for brain size) seemed to confirm his
hypothesis. As quoted by Stephen Jay Gould, Binet could not
be more sure: “The relationship between the intelligence of
subjects and the volume of their head . . . is very real and has
been confirmed by all methodical investigators, without
exception . . . we conclude that the . . . [correlation between
head size and intelligence] must be considered as incontestable.”12 But he was too good a scientist to accept his first
findings and conclusions. Two years later, he wrote:
I feared that in making measurements on heads with the intention of
finding a difference in volume between an intelligent and a less
intelligent head, I would be led to increase, unconsciously and in
good faith, the cephalic volume of intelligent heads and to decrease
that of unintelligent heads.
....
Suggestibility . . . works less on an act of which we have full
consciousness, than on a half-conscious act—and this is precisely its
danger.13

Note that skull measurement can serve either natural or social
science purposes. If one’s hypothesis concerns the relation
between skull size and brain maturation, then it may qualify
10

Id. at 1082.
Id.
12
STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 176 (1996) (quoting A.
Binet, Historique des Recherches sur les Rapports de l’Intelligence avec la Grandeur et
la Forme de la Tête. 5 L’ANNEE PSYCHOLOGIQUE 245, 294-95 (1898)).
13
Id. at 177 (emphasis added) (quoting A. Binet, Recherches sur la Technique
de la Mensuration de la Tête Vivante, 7 L’ANNEE PSYCHOLOGIQUE 314, 323-24 (1900)).
11
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as natural science. If the relation is between skull size and
social skills, then it may qualify as social science. The
opportunity for bias in measurement and for drawing
conclusions is not inherently different in these two cases.14 One
need only turn to the controversy involving evolution and
creationism to find another clash of values affecting data
interpretation in a natural science. Fortunately, both natural
and social science provide methodological safeguards to
minimize bias in every phase of the scientific enterprise, from
problem selection to measurement to drawing inferences and
implications from data.
Parallel to the effects of bias in scientific research,
Faigman makes a persuasive case for the effects of bias in
courts’ selection and interpretation of scientific findings to
justify, or perhaps to rationalize, their decisions.15 The use of
neurological evidence that the brains of eighteen-year-olds are
still developing to support a decision to exclude the death
penalty for people eighteen or younger is a case in point.16 But
if the continuing development of the brain is the definitive
factor, then twenty-five-year-olds should also be spared. But of
course, scientific evidence is not the only factor to be taken into
account. Surely there is a place for community standards,
values, and ethics, in addition to facts, in legal decisionmaking. Distinguishing between fact and value does not
necessarily mean that we should, or even can, exclude value as
an important factor. But it is important to explicitly recognize
the use of values and not pretend that it’s “just the facts” that
drive judicial decisions.
Professor Lawrence Solan provides revealing examples
of how judges interpret language to serve their individual,
value-driven positions on constitutional law.17 One of the most
striking examples is the interpretation of the word “use” in the
context of illegal drug transactions. Prison sentences for those
convicted of drug offenses are often longer if a gun was “used”
during a drug transaction. In one case, a convicted person
appealed his sentence by claiming that his “use” of a gun did

14
Still, there is the lingering intuition that social science is not as “hard” as
natural science, as reflected in W.H. Auden’s cynical remark, “Thou shalt not commit a
social science.” W.H. AUDEN, “Under Which Lyre,” reprinted in COLLECTED POEMS 335
(Edward Mendelson ed., 1991).
15
Faigman, supra note 4, at 1084-85.
16
See id. at 1086-87.
17
See generally LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES (1993).
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not fall under the gun-use sentencing provision because he
used the gun for barter, offering it in lieu of additional money
to buy drugs during a sting operation.18 In effect, he did not use
the gun as a weapon, but as a bargaining instrument. The
United States Supreme Court in a majority decision ruled that
the term “use” covered any use of a gun, whether as a weapon
or not, and declined to interpret “use” in terms of an inferred
legislators’ intent of use-as-a-weapon.19 I am confident that
Faigman could cite many such examples, and that he would not
be surprised by this one.
On a related issue, Richard Katskee distinguishes
between revealed truth20 and scientific truth. I think that most
of us would agree with his characterization that received truth
and scientific truth are incommensurate. But that does not
mean that a given individual cannot hold two sets of beliefs:
one based on religion and the other on science, even when those
two beliefs are glaringly contradictory. According to biblical
teaching, the universe was created by God and the earth is at
most 10,000 years old.21 Young-earth creationists believe this.
According to contemporary paleontology, though, the earth is
hundreds of millions of years old, and events can be dated
using fossil records and various other dating techniques.
According to a recent Ph.D. dissertation, a species of marine
reptiles, mosasaurs, vanished at the end of the Cretaceous era
about 65 million years ago.22 Palentologists believe this. What
is intriguing about these two beliefs about the age of the earth
is that one man, Marcus Ross, believes that both are true.23
Ross is the author of the dissertation on mosasaurs, even
though he identifies himself as a young-earth creationist. How
does he reconcile his two completely different sets of beliefs?
These views can coexist because, as Ross put it, he is
“separating the different paradigms.”24
Can people in general separate their religious and
scientific paradigms, and if they can, will they then rely
exclusively on the scientific paradigm in the legal and political
18

Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 227 (1993).
Id. at 240-41.
20
By “revealed” or “received” truth, I refer to truth given by one or another
dogma, including religion, that is not subject either to logical or empirical test.
21
See Cornelia Dean, Believing Scripture But Playing by Science’s Rules, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 12, 2007.
22
See Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
19
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realm? When it comes to values and strongly held religious
beliefs, I seriously doubt it; witness the perennial disputes
about teaching evolution, providing information on sexually
transmitted diseases, making abortion safe and available, even
the inclusion of the word “God” in our pledge of allegiance.
Separation of revealed and scientific truth is relatively easy in
principle. Separation in practice may well be impossible—and
for very good reasons. Scientific truth can adjudicate decisions
on how to implement policies. But the policies themselves often
stem from values and moral beliefs, and these are, in the end,
not provided by scientific fact or theory. My guess is that the
best we can do is recognize the differences between science and
religion, and try to keep those distinctions in mind when
evaluating conflicting views in the legal and political realms.
To whom do we turn when we are in doubt about either
scientific or religious truths? Professor Frank Keil raises an
important issue: when do we know that we do not know?25 This
question is the province of the field of metacognition, the study
of how we assess what and how we know things. As Keil
observes, people are not very good at assessing their own states
of explanatory knowledge.26 A few familiar household examples
should suffice. What do people know of the operation of
thermostats? In a study of how to get people to conserve energy
in heating their homes, people were asked how they used their
thermostats.27 More than half the people interviewed set their
thermostat five degrees higher than the temperature they
really wanted in the belief that the house would heat up faster
that way. Then, when the house was warm enough, they would
reset the thermostat to the desired resting level. This
invariably wasted energy because people rarely noticed when
the temperature they actually desired had been reached or
exceeded. In an informal follow-up to that study, I asked
several people to explain how their toilets worked. Most had
only the vaguest ideas, mentioning pumps, propellers, suction
devices and the like. Yet most of us, including the people in
these studies, feel that we know about thermostats, toilets, and
other common household devices well enough. Only when our

25
Frank C. Keil, Getting to the Truth: Grounding Incomplete Knowledge, 73
BROOK. L. REV. 1035, 1035 (2008) (this volume).
26
Id. at 1037-41.
27
See generally Willet Kempton, Two Theories of Home Heat Control, 10
COGNITIVE SCI. 75 (1986).
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knowledge is probed beyond mere surface level is our relative
state of ignorance exposed.
Keil astutely points out the relevance of this lack of
knowledge, and the lack of awareness of that lack of
knowledge, in legal contexts.28 What is common knowledge to
experts and to some lay people is certainly not common
knowledge to everyone. Even more important, what may seem
like common knowledge to someone could actually have been
learned very recently, even within the proceedings of a court
case. Jurors can often learn something in the course of trial
testimony and then, a few minutes later, be under the
impression that they had known that “fact” all the time. This is
a well-known phenomenon in cognitive and social psychology,
the “hindsight bias.”29 Hindsight bias refers to the tendency of
people who learn something new that seems commonsensical to
come to believe, sincerely believe, that they had known it all
along. This bias may have its roots in early childhood, where
the analogous phenomenon is observed in a “false belief”
context. 30
In this context, a child, say David, is shown a candy box
and asked, “What’s in it?” David replies, of course, “Candy.”
The box is then opened, and lo and behold there are crayons,
not candy, in the box. David is then asked what his friend
Tommy will think is in the box if he is shown the closed box.
David’s answer? “Crayons!” This is hindsight attributed to
another person. And, if we now ask the first child, David, what
he thought was in the box before it was opened, he says, with
great confidence, “Crayons!”
While not so extreme as this example, adults in the
context of jury deliberations and decision-making will not only
fall prey to the hindsight bias, believing that X is something
they knew all along, but also that X is common knowledge,
something that everyone knows or should know. For example,
it is not common knowledge that using a racing (shallow) dive
into a four-foot deep swimming pool can result in traumatic
spinal cord injury and quadriplegia. This is because the neck
can flex sharply forward if the diver’s forehead hits the bottom
28

See generally Keil, supra note 25.
See generally Baruch Fischoff, Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The Effect of
Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288 (1975).
30
See John H. Flavell et al., Development of the Appearance-Reality
Distinction, 15 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 95 (1983). (The description in the next paragraph
draws from this study.)
29
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and does not slide. The weight of the diver’s body moving down
and forward can then break the neck and crush cervical
vertebrae. A steeper dive poses a risk of concussion, but less of
a risk of traumatic spinal cord injury. I served as an expert
witness in a case involving such an injury. After an aquatics
expert had explained the potential risks of shallow racing
dives, the jury members seemed to understand the mechanics
of spinal cord injury in that context. After a brief recess, an
opposing witness testified that it was common knowledge that
shallow racing dives were dangerous, and so the quadriplegic
victim knew, or should have known, the potential consequences
of his (obviously foolhardy) behavior. From the jurors’ nods of
agreement, it seemed to me that the hindsight bias was at
work. Now that the jurors knew of the hazard, they felt that
it was common knowledge and that everyone should know it.
In cases like this one, expert testimony on the hazards of
diving and the need for adequate warnings is not enough. Such
testimony should be supplemented by a description and
explanation of how the hindsight bias works and how it can
lead to erroneous beliefs about what is common knowledge and
what is not.
Keil nicely points out the hindsight bias in the context
of how people decide whether or not something is or is not a
legitimate area of expertise.31 The legal community should be
aware of these cognitive and metacognitive biases, both in
terms of what they themselves believe and how these biases
can affect jurors’ beliefs and decisions. So, not only should
expert witnesses be able to explain complex phenomena in
their own fields of expertise to lay people, they should also be
able to explain relevant cognitive and metacognitive phenomena as well.
In the end, what are we to make of Bill Klem’s
declarative realism, that a pitch is nothing—neither a strike
nor a ball—until the umpire calls it? There is, after all, the
assumption of scientific realism, which, as Faigman persuasively argues, is a necessary assumption. Katskee adds another
important element concerning one aspect of scientific realism
in the context of judicial decision-making: the critical
importance of decisions seeming right and justifiable in the
public eye, even when such decisions create judicial “truth.”32
31
32

Keil, supra note 26, at 1043-45.
Katskee, supra note 5, at 860-65.
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Declarative realism, as exemplified by Bill Klem, is constrained
by scientific realism—the call must appear justified by the
ball’s perceived trajectory in or out of the strike zone. Similarly,
judicial decisions, such as the one described by Katskee
concerning the teaching of intelligent design, are instances of
declarative realism.33 Nevertheless, like Klem’s calls, they must
be justifiable by the evidence and arguments presented. More
important, perhaps, they must be perceived as justifiable by the
legal community and ultimately by the public. Yes, truth is
hard to come by, but both the legal and scientific communities
have evolved principles and procedures to minimize bias and
integrate declarative truth with scientific and, I daresay,
judicial realism.

33

See Katskee, supra note 5, at 873-76.

